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 Elected officials in the United States appear to represent relatively extreme support coali-
 tions rather than the interests of middle-of-the-road voters. This contention is supported by
 analysis of variance of liberal-conservative positions in the United States Senate from 1959 to
 1980. Within both the Democratic and the Republican parties, there is considerable varia-
 tion in liberal-conservative positions, but two senators from the same state and party tend to
 be very similar. In contrast, senators from the same state but from different parties are
 highly dissimilar, suggesting that each party represents an extreme support coalition in the
 state. Moreover, the distribution of senators is now consistent with the hypothesis that, in the
 long run, both parties have an equal chance of winning any seat in the Senate. This result
 suggests that there is now competition between equally balanced but extreme support coali-
 tions throughout most of the United States.
 W e contend that, at nearly every level of the political system,
 American politics has been polarized in ways that do not well represent
 the interests of middle-of-the-road voters. For better or for worse, con-
 stituencies are generally fought over by two opposing coalitions, liberal
 and conservative, each with relatively extreme views. The middle-of-
 the-road voter is thus not a member of a silent majority desiring some
 radical social change, but a moderate individual seeking to avoid the wide
 swings in policy engendered by our political system. In the environmen-
 * This work was supported by NSF grant SES-831-390. The research was performed
 while Rosenthal was a Sherman Fairchild Distinguished Scholar at the California Institute of
 Technology. We thank C. Bullock, B. Cain, J. Ferejohn, M. Fiorina, R. Kiewiet, A.
 Meltzer, and T. Romer for comments, although our own coordinates may not match some of
 their ideal points.
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 tal area, for example, we presume that the middle-of-the-road voter
 would like to see the EPA strike a more constant posture, somewhere be-
 tween its relatively zealous pre-Reagan activities and its relatively lax ac-
 tions in the current administration. Similarly, we suspect most citizens
 would prefer a federal education policy somewhere between the near
 total support for NEA positions found in the Carter years and the near
 total abandonment of a federal role under Reagan.
 The aim of this paper is to document that both the composition of the
 two-member state delegations in the U.S. Senate and the roll-call voting
 behavior of these delegations have become increasingly consistent with a
 model of polarized but competitive politics. Specifically, we posit that,
 in each state, there is evenly balanced competition between polarized
 groups. Identifying the composition of these groups and relating the
 composition to constituency characteristics are beyond the scope of this
 paper (see n. 4).
 We begin by asking how we can tell whether middle-of-the-road
 constituency interests are being represented. A traditional approach has
 been to assemble a battery of such socioeconomic measures as income,
 education, and race to determine if roll-call voting is related to constit-
 uency variables. This method has several drawbacks, including the dif-
 ficult problem of accurately measuring a constituency's economic self-
 interest on a given issue.'
 A more direct approach takes advantage of an implication in the notion
 that legislators represent the particular interests of their constituencies. If
 middle-of-the-road interests are consistently represented, then legislators
 from the same constituency ought to be similar ideologically and ought to
 vote alike.
 The U.S. Senate is a terrain de choix for applying this direct method
 since each state is represented by two senators. There appears to be a
 very simple method for assessing whether two senators represent a com-
 mon interest: take all the roll-call votes for a given session of the Senate
 and compute the percentage of votes for which the pair did not vote alike.
 If a common constituency interest is being represented, presumably the
 two senators will almost never vote differently. They certainly should
 have less disagreement with each other than they have with other
 members of the Senate.
 Unfortunately, looking at disagreement percentages is a flawed ap-
 proach. Consider two states, the first with a very liberal senator and a
 moderately liberal senator, the second with a moderately conservative
 I For a detailed review of this literature, see Fiorina (1974). See also Kuklinski (1979) and
 the recent critique by Peltzman (1982).
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 senator and a very conservative senator. Next, consider a series of votes
 on, say, voting rights, that divide moderate conservatives from more ex-
 treme ones. In this case, the two senators from the first state will vote
 together while the two from the second state will split. While each pair
 of senators has the same ideological separation, one pair agreed and the
 other did not. This situation illustrates how the disagreement percentage
 depends not only on intrinsic differences between the senators but also on
 the content of the bills before a given session of the Senate.2
 To find this intrinsic policy difference or distance between two
 senators, we instead start with direct measures of distances. Each year,
 some thirty interest groups in Washington, including COPE, ACU, ADA,
 and UAW, rate senators. The ratings offer a measure of the distance bet-
 ween each interest group and the senator: a high rating is low distance,
 and a low rating is high distance. By employing the technique of least
 squares unfolding (Poole, 1984), we can use these distances to place both
 the interest groups and the senators on a liberal-conservative scale. We
 have scaled all twenty-two sessions of Congress from 1959 through 1980
 using this method. Scale values for the senators generally range from
 near -1 for extreme liberals (such as Ted Kennedy) to + 1 for extreme
 conservatives (such as Jesse Helms). The liberal-conservative placements
 accurately reproduce the original ratings.3
 We have reason to believe that our procedure is very robust. For 1979
 and 1980, we employed an entirely different scaling procedure, one based
 solely on the recorded roll-call vote data (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985).
 This procedure, which uses all roll calls rather than just those selected by
 interest groups, recovered liberal-conservative locations for the senators
 virtually identical to those obtained from the interest-group ratings. In
 addition, we recovered similar liberal-conservative positions when we
 used a much cruder least squares decomposition (Poole, 1983) of the roll-
 call votes. The common scale recovered by these techniques correctly
 classifies upwards of 80 percent of the individual votes in the Senate. It is
 as successful on votes not used by the interest groups as it is on the votes
 used for the ratings (Poole and Daniels, 1985). We thus conclude that we
 are accurately capturing liberal-conservative positions in the Senate and
 that these positions represent the major and dominant factor underlying
 roll-call voting behavior.
 By discarding disagreement percentages and favoring liberal-conserv-
 ative positions, we maintain the basic comparative technique. For
 middle-of-the-road representation, it is necessary (but not sufficient) that
 2 For a formal discussion of this point, see Morrison (1972).
 3For a detailed description of the scaling, see Poole (1981, 1984).
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 senators from the same state be close to each other on the liberal-conserv-
 ative scale.4
 The middle-of-the-road proposition is most likely to be challenged
 when one senator is a Democrat and the other is a Republican. From
 1977 through 1982, California was represented by Alan Cranston, a very
 liberal senator, and Sam Hayakawa, a very conservative one. This
 ideological separation is not unusual for California: Hayakawa's seat had
 previously been held by Tunney, a liberal, and Tunney was preceded by
 the very conservative Murphy. Before Tunney, a six-year term was
 served by the liberals Engle and Salinger. They were preceded by an
 archconservative, William Knowland. The California example is obvi-
 ously very damaging to the case of middle-of-the-road democracy. But is
 California typical of the entire nation?
 To study this question, we began by dividing the states into three types
 as shown in figure 1. There are states with two Republican senators,
 states with two Democrats, and states with a mixed delegations The
 number of mixed states has steadily risen. While half the increase reflects
 the collapse of the solid South, mixed delegations increased throughout
 the nation. By 1980, half the states were mixed.
 The distribution of states between mixed and solid types depends on the
 nature of competition. One possible model is that of national competi-
 4Related research on the House, to be discussed later, is found in Fiorina (1974). Subse-
 quent to the initial draft of this paper, we discovered the work of Bullock and Brady (1983),
 who used a methodology almost identical to ours with similar results. There are several dif-
 ferences between our work and theirs: (1) we treat twenty-two years rather than a single year;
 (2) rather than using just two rating scales per year, we use a synthesis of over fifty scales.
 Since the recovered positions "explain" all votes to about the same degree (Poole, 1981; Poole
 and Rosenthal, 1985; Poole, 1984), we can now claim that the Fiorina and Bullock-Brady
 type of results are robust to the scales chosen for analysis. (3) We preserve a distinction be-
 tween homogeneous Democratic states and homogeneous Republican states. This distinction
 proves relevant in the analysis. On the other hand, Bullock and Brady's paper is more am-
 bitious than ours in the sense that they attempt to explicate these findings in terms of the
 heterogeneity of states. A similar comparison of pairs of senators from the same state is found
 in Peltzman (1982).
 5 The number of cases in each type is obviously small. Consequently, readers are urged to
 look at the trends over several years presented in the figures and not to focus on results for in-
 dividual years. In developing the types, we made the following decisions. Strom Thurmond
 switched from Democrat to Republican in 1964. We classified him as a Democrat prior to
 1964, as a Republican after 1964, and we discarded South Carolina from the analysis in 1964,
 which explains the presence of only forty-nine states in that year. In addition, Harry Byrd,
 Jr. of Virginia left the Democrats in 1970 to become an independent. Virginia has been
 discarded from the analysis for 1970 through 1980. It was also necessary to discard South
 Dakota (except for figure 1) in 1972 because Karl Mundt had no recorded votes for that year.
 Had Mundt voted, our results would have been reinforced since South Dakota's other senator
 was the highly liberal George McGovern.
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 tion. For example, one party - the Democrats - might represent the
 poor, those with below the national median income, and the other party
 represents the rich. In such a situation, one would expect to find rela-
 tively few mixed states; poor states would be solid for the Democrats and
 rich ones solid for the Republicans. An alternative view is a model of
 local competition, which corresponds to the view that national parties are
 actually coalitions of local parties (see Sundquist, 1973, p. 37). In the
 stylized local model, the Democrats would, in each state, represent those
 with below median state income.
 Under local competition, with party coalitions evenly balanced in each
 state, we would have a fully competitive Senate. This model leads to a
 strong prediction about the distribution of mixed and solid delegations.
 Under this model, the long-run probability that any seat is won by either
 of the two parties would be one-half. (We say "long run" because we do
 not want to rule out scandal, incumbency, and other factors giving a
 short-run bias to one party.) When full competition prevails, one ex-
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 pects on average, 50 percent of the states to be represented by mixed
 delegations, 25 percent to have homogeneous Republican delegations,
 and 25 percent to have homogeneous Democrat delegations.6 Histori-
 cally, the composition of the Senate is not consistent with this competitive
 model. Examination of the data for the period 1912-1959 discloses that
 mixed delegations were always far less than 50 percent of the total. At
 the beginning of our liberal-conservative time series, in 1959, with the
 Democrats in control, there were still only sixteen mixed delegations, and
 there was less than one chance in one thousand that the observed distribu-
 tion would arise under the null hypothesis of full competition. But after
 1980, when the distribution is very close to the expected 50-25-25, the
 chances become better than nine in ten. The current distribution of
 delegations is consistent with our claim of intense competition between
 opposing ideological coalitions.
 Our aim is to assess the ideological similarity of senators from a given
 state. To do this, we must know something about the variability in posi-
 tions of all senators. This variability can be captured in the measure of
 variance in liberal-conservative positions.7
 One cannot formally compare variances from separate scalings.
 Moreover, the substantive nature of the bills and issues that fall along the
 liberal-conservative dimension changes from year to year. Perhaps the
 basic content of "liberal" and "conservative" also changes. Such changes
 are not central to our analysis, which is concerned with whether polariza-
 tion occurs on issues that are currently relevant. To place the scaling in a
 common frame of reference appropriate for our purposes, we first carried
 out a linear transformation of each scale.8
 The transformations and the liberal-conservative coordinates for a
 combined scale were chosen to minimize the sum of squared errors be-
 tween the combined scale and the original scales. This technique
 assumes that the liberal-conservative positions of individual senators are
 stable in time. Thus, variations in the liberal-conservative makeup of
 the Senate would arise mainly through changes in membership (Bullock,
 1981; Stone, 1977, cited by Kuklinski, 1979; and Clausen, 1973). The
 results of the combined scale are consistent with this view of stability. The
 6 This point is ignored by Bullock and Brady (1983), who use the presence of a mixed
 delegation in a state as a measure of competitiveness in their path analysis. But such a
 measure is biased since, in a fully competitive world, one-party delegations will arise as fre-
 quently as mixed ones. A Senate with all delegations mixed would not be consistent with
 competition but with some other model, such as duopolistic sharing of seats.
 7 See the Appendix for details on the variance computations.
 8 We used the procedure of Poole (1983), which generalizes the Eckart-Young (1936)
 matrix approximation method to allow for missing data.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 22 Sep 2017 21:08:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE POLARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1067
 combined scale correlates very highly with each of the yearly scales.9 The
 results below are based on the transformed yearly scales.
 The variance for the entire Senate is plotted in figure 2. The variance
 exhibits no long-term trends. There is a slight dip during the Great Soci-
 ety and peaks during Vietnam and Watergate, but values in the last three
 years are very close to those of the first three years. Throughout the past
 two decades, there has been a polarized distribution in the Senate, with
 liberal and conservative clusters and relatively few moderates in the
 center. Typical histograms are shown in figure 3 for six of the twenty-
 two years. The plot of the variance shows that we will be concerned with
 a basic pattern of representation, one prevalent throughout the period.
 Below the plot of the variance, figure 2 also shows the percentage of the
 variance that is explained by separating the senators into the three types
 FIGURE 2
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 9 Squared correlations between individual years and the combined scale range from 0.88
 to 0.97. Results reported in this paper are virtually identical to those obtained using the un-
 transformed scales. In fact, the linear transformations show little variation across years.
 Nonetheless, results such as the variance plot in figure 2 do not follow automatically from this
 year-to-year stability. Since the correlations are computed for the members of the Senate in a
 given year, variances could vary across years because of changes in the Senate's member-
 ship.
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 of states. This series is unit-free, and it has no year-to-year comparison
 problems. Again, there are no long-term trends, although there is a dip
 that bottoms out at the height of the Vietnam controversy. The impor-
 tant finding is that the state types account for little of the ideological
 FIGuRE 3
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 variability in the Senate. The percentage averages about 10; only once
 does it pass, barely, 20.
 One key factor in the small percentage of the variance explained by
 separating the states according to type is that mixed-state senators do not
 behave alike; rather, to some degree, they behave like Democrats and
 Republicans. Indeed, figure 2 shows that if we separate by party instead
 of by state type we explain more of the variance. It also indicates that
 party has become more important in recent years (largely because of the
 lesser weight of southern conservatives among the Democrats). But party
 itself never explains as much as half the variance. Most of the variability
 in senatorial liberal-conservative positions cannot be explained by party
 affiliation; it must instead be explained by variations between and within
 state delegations.
 Comparison of the within-state variation to the between-state variation
 is the central element in our argument. First, however, we pause to con-
 sider the total variation for each type relative to the total variation for the
 Senate, as plotted in figure 4. If a delegation type was as heterogeneous
 as the Senate as a whole, its own variance would be 100 percent of the
 variance of the full Senate. A totally homogeneous type, with all its
 senators at a single value on the scale, would be at 0 percent.
 FIGURE 4
 TYPE VARIANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VARIANCE
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 Democratic and Republican states are, as expected, more homogeneous
 than the Senate as a whole. Undoubtedly because of the presence of
 southern conservatives, the Democrats were initially not very
 homogeneous. Until Nixon's second term, their variance was generally
 between 80 and 100 percent of that of the full Senate. The Republicans
 were initially more homogeneous, approximately 40 percent of the full
 Senate. But the senatorial party was badly split during Watergate, and
 the Republican figure actually exceeded 100 percent in 1974 and 1975.
 Carter's presidency was needed to reunify the party.
 Under Carter, the two parties looked very similar in their degree of
 heterogeneity, supporting our position on two competitively similar op-
 posing coalitions. Although the Democratic and Republican types were
 more homogeneous than the full Senate, they still exhibited substantial
 diversity in liberal-conservative positions, the percentage for both types
 hovering near 50 percent during the Carter years.
 In turn, the mixed delegations are far more heterogeneous than the
 one-party delegations. Indeed, they tend to be slightly more
 heterogeneous than the Senate as a whole, since their percentage - which
 exhibits little temporal variation -oscillates between 100 and 120 per-
 cent.
 The heterogeneity of mixed delegations need not have occurred. If
 homogeneous Republican states were "conservative" states, homogeneous
 Democrat, "liberal," and mixed, "moderate," then the mixed delegations
 could have been as homogeneous as the one-party delegations. Instead,
 the heterogeneity of mixed delegations suggests that these states are far
 from moderate in their representation.
 We now turn to the analysis of the heterogeneity in mixed and solid
 types. The total variance for a type equals the variance within states plus
 the variance between states. If both senators from a given state represent
 the same constituency interest, the within-state variance should be quite
 small. The heterogeneity within a type should be explicable by the vary-
 ing interests of the states.
 The Democratic and Republican types witness consistent interest
 representation. For the Democrats, within-state variance is perennially
 extremely small, about 10 percent of the total type variance (see figure 5).
 For the Republicans, it is only slightly larger, with the exception of two
 peaks: one in 1965-1966, the other from 1971 through 1976. Even at the
 peaks, however, within-state variance is always less than between-state
 variance. One of the peaks is largely explicable. In the 1970 New York
 senatorial elections, our model of two opposing coalitions broke down. A
 triangular contest saw the election of James Buckley, a conservative,
 while New York's other Republican senator, Jacob Javits, remained the
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 22 Sep 2017 21:08:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE POLARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1071
 most liberal Republican member of the Senate. Political observers cor-
 rectly predicted that Buckley's deviant political behavior would not sur-
 vive one term. Deleting New York from the analysis for the Buckley
 years dampens the peak considerably (again, see figure 5). Since
 Buckley's departure in 1976, the Republican and Democratic types have
 closely resembled each other.
 Summarizing the results for one-party states, we found important and
 similar residual variation after controlling for party, as shown in figure 4.
 As demonstrated in figure 5, this residual variation is overwhelmingly the
 result of variation across states, and it only slightly reflects variation be-
 tween senators from the same state. Senate-watchers have in fact sug-
 gested to us that senators from the same party and state actively consult
 each other prior to voting. They are thus likely to represent the views of
 their support coalitions rather than their personal ideological views.
 Are the support coalitions representative of middle-of-the-road
 citizens? The data for mixed states argue strongly that the Democratic
 and Republican support coalitions in each state represent relatively ex-
 treme views. The two senators from a mixed state do not adopt common
 positions. The within-state variance percentage in this type always
 substantially exceeds that for the Republican and Democratic types, and
 FIGuRE 5
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 it is generally over 50 percent of the total. That is, there are generally
 more differences internal to each state than there are between the various
 states. State interests are thus less important than the support-coalition
 interests within each state.'0
 The same story is told in slightly different form in figure 6. There we
 plot a within-state standard deviation (the square root of the variance)
 band for each type. That is, each band shows the variation we would ex-
 pect if all senators for a type both came from an average state for that type
 and exhibited only within-state variation. Bands for the homogeneous
 Democratic and Republican types are narrow and generally well
 separated. They overlap only briefly and slightly for three of the Viet-
 nam years. In contrast, the mixed-state band is very large, usually cover-
 ing all of the Democratic and much of the Republican band. These
 results argue strongly that while constituency interests are represented in
 Congress, the interests are mainly those of relatively extreme support
 coalitions rather than those of middle-of-the-road voters.
 Some indication that support-coalition interests may be abating in
 favor of general constituency interests is found in figure 5, which shows
 that the importance of within-state variation in mixed states has
 FIGURE 6
 ONE STANDARD DEVIATION BANDS FOR WITHIN-STATE VARIANCE
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 10 This argument has been made by Huntington (1950), Fiorina (1974), and Fenno (1977).
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 undergone a secular decline, falling from the 70-80 percent range found
 until 1965 to a 50-60 percent range found after 1973. Such a fall would
 be consistent with the increased emphasis on case work and home-office
 staffs found in recent years (Fiorina, 1978). Yet the fall is largely offset
 by another phenomenon, the increasing polarization of the underlying
 support coalitions. This is seen in figure 7, where we have plotted stan-
 dard deviation bands for the total type variance of Republican and
 Democratic types. A similar story is told by figure 8, where the plots con-
 cern all senators and not just those from one-party delegations. Pre-
 Vietnam party positions were fairly polarized, and there was only
 moderate overlap of the bands. With Vietnam, party lines became
 blurred, and a very substantial overlap appeared. Since 1975, however,
 party separation has been greater than ever, largely occasioned by a
 secular liberal drift of the Democrats. The overlap is now smaller than it
 has been since 1959. So, while senators may be slightly less prone to vote
 their support coalition's interests, those interests are more polarized than
 ever."
 FIGURE 7
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 11 Bullock (1981) indicates that newly elected House southern Democrats are more liberal
 than Democrats they replace whereas newly elected southern Republicans are more conserv-
 ative than their predecessors.
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 FIGURE 8
 ONE STANDARD DEVIATION BANDS FOR ALL PARTY MEMBERS
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 The polarization of the positions of individual senators in terms of their
 support coalition's interests may have muted policy consequences if
 liberals and conservatives are balanced in the Senate. However, the scales
 can tip. Recent work, based on the alternative roll-call method described
 above, shows that eighteen senators serving in the 95th Congress had
 replacements in the 96th Congress whose average position was three-
 fourths of a unit more conservative on our two-unit scale. This shift is
 hardly unrelated to the shift in economic policy brought about by the
 Reagan administration.
 The trend to polarized competition that can sustain substantial shifts in
 policy is partly the consequence of the disappearance of traditional
 southern politics (Bullock, 1981). Southern Democratic senators have
 become less conservative, and southern Republican senators who have
 broken the solid South are generally very conservative. The development
 of a two-party South accounts for about half the trend to more mixed
 states shown in figure 1.
 Events outside the South are of equal importance. Moderate
 Republicans are vanishing nationally. California again provides an ex-
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 ample. At the beginning of our time series, the other California Senate
 seat was held by Thomas Kuchel, a moderate Republican almost at the
 center of the spectrum. In 1968, Kuchel was replaced by the highly
 liberal Democrat, Alan Cranston. It is difficult to imagine a moderate
 from either party having much success in contemporary California
 politics. Moderate-central positions are generally disappearing in favor
 of the relatively extreme positions of support coalitions.
 Why are general constituency interests so often sacrificed to those of
 support coalitions? Our interest-group ratings themselves tell much of
 the story. In our liberal-conservative scaling, most of the interest groups
 turn out to be more extreme than most of the senators (Poole, 1981).
 Groups with moderate views do not get involved in politics. Candidates
 in turn need people willing to contribute money and ring doorbells. While
 some competitive pressures may push candidates toward the center, the
 need for resources retains them at the extremes. Ladd (1982, p. 66) notes
 that "college [-educated] Democrats are noticeably more liberal . .. than
 their party's rank and file, while college [-educated] Republicans are
 rather consistently more conservative than their party's mass member-
 ship." This "polarization of the activist cohorts of the respective parties"
 means that although candidates might win votes by moving to the center,
 a centrist position will generally leave them without enough resources for
 an effective campaign. In particular, a centrist position may spell doom
 in primary elections (Wright, 1978; Polsby and Wildavsky, 1980).
 We indicated at the outset that we expect our analysis to apply far
 beyond the Senate. The presidential analogue of the story is typified by
 our EPA and education examples. Wittman (1983) recently surveyed
 four studies that show "persistent differences" in policies of Democratic
 and Republican presidents or in positions of Democratic and Republican
 presidential candidates. Most relevant is the work of Hibbs (1977), who
 has argued for the presence of an "ideological business cycle" (our term)
 brought about by shifts in administration. At the state level, we could
 continue to look at California, appealing to the Brown-Reagan-Brown-
 Deukmejian shuffling in the governor's office. Rather than a continual
 adjustment of middle-of-the-road policies, there are relatively rapid
 swings in the policy preferences of elected representatives and executives.
 At first glance, the House of Representatives appears to yield somewhat
 different results. On the one hand, our results are similar to those of
 Fiorina (1974), who compared changes in a constituency's roll-call
 behavior when the seat changed parties. Yet the key observation about
 the House is not that party makes a difference in how the constituency's
 representative votes, but that so few seats change party. We have a
 bountiful literature on vanishing marginals, declining competition, and
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Fri, 22 Sep 2017 21:08:48 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1076 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 46, 1984
 the incumbency advantage. The House seems very different from our
 fully competitive Senate.
 To some degree, it is easier to observe competition in the Senate than in
 the House. When we talked about the Senate as being fully competitive,
 we spoke of long-term probabilities. Indeed, incumbency has obvious
 advantages in the Senate also. A major recession notwithstanding, the
 Senate's delegation composition barely budged in the 1982 elections.
 Despite short-term incumbency advantage, Senate seats look more com-
 petitive than those of the House, because of the election of two members
 per constituency. The presence of mixed delegations makes competition
 manifest. Certainly, if the House had two-member constituencies, we
 could also expect large numbers of mixed delegations.
 However, institutional features make the House less competitive than
 the Senate. Prolific gerrymandering (Abramowitz, 1983) creates
 homogeneous House districts (Cain, forthcoming). In homogeneous
 farming, suburban, or black districts, for example, middle-of-the-road
 constituency interests are almost trivially represented. In addition, the
 smaliei size oi House 6is'Tiets -wil nalr alXy -iesluW in greater swoial
 homogeneity and less competition (Hibbing and Brandes, 1983). But in-
 stead of a polarization of support groups within constituencies, as in the
 Senate, the House would then have a polarization of constituencies.
 Representatives are still likely to exhibit policy preferences that are ex-
 treme relative to national averages. In fact, histograms for the House
 similar to figure 3 indicate that the liberal-conservative distribution in
 the House is far more polarized than in the Senate (Poole and Daniels,
 1985). Since spatial analyses of policy preferences (Rabinowitz, 1978;
 Poole and Rosenthal, 1985) often disclose a unimodal distribution in the
 mass public, the polarized distribution of elected representatives and in-
 terest groups represents a curious form of representation.
 We are sufficiently sophisticated students of social choice to make no
 normative case for middle-of-the-road representation over support-
 coalition representation. Some colleagues have in fact taken the position
 that polarized representation has a normative value: providing a
 mechanism for implementing significant policy change. As a
 counterweight to this view, we note that alternation in power among sup-
 port coalitions imposes considerable costs. In the last months of the
 Brown administration in California, the state initiated commuter rail
 service between Oxnard and Los Angeles. Shortly after Deukmejian took
 office, the service was abandoned. While it is uncertain whether aban-
 donment was preferable to continuing the service, never starting the serv-
 ice at all would clearly dominate the actual policy sequence. Unfor-
 12 As examples of this literature, see Ferejohn (1977) and Fiorina (1978).
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 tunately, the costs of ping-ponging may be inevitable in a pluralist
 democracy. 13
 13 Lijphart (1977) has suggested that pluralist two-party systems typified by Britain and
 the United States may be more subject to wide policy swings than multiparty proportional
 systems typified by the Netherlands and Switzerland. He gives the nationalization-dena-
 tionalization cycles of the British steel industry as an example of how ping-ponging may be
 more costly than a consistent policy.
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 APPENDIX: COMPUTATION OF THE VARIANCES
 Let Xi be the coordinate of Senator i. Then, the average coordinate of
 some subset of senators S of size Ns is
 Xs = E XjNs,
 ies
 and the variance is
 Var(X)s = E (X,-Xs)21Ns.
 Let X and Var(X) be the average and variance respectively for the entire
 Senate. Then the between-party variance is
 ND(XD-X)2 + NR(XR-X)2
 ND + NR
 where D denotes the subset of Democrats, R, Republicans. Then the
 percentage explained by party (fig. 2) is
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 PE = 100 14
 Var (X)
 The percentage explained by state type is computed in a similar fashion.
 Computation of the percentages in figure 4 can be illustrated by the
 Democrats:
 Var(X)D
 PDm = 1 00-
 Var (X)
 where DH refers to Democratic senators from homogeneous states with
 two Democratic senators.
 The between-state variance for the Democratic type is computed as
 follows. Let Xj be the average of the position of the two senators from
 the state j. Then,
 VBDH (Xj-XDH) 2I (NDHI2).
 The within-state variance can then be found by using a well-known iden-
 tity.
 VwH = Var(X)DH - VEDH
 and
 VWDH
 PWDH = 100 H
 Var(X)DH
 The other percentages in figure 5 are found similarly.
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